

# Imposition and Collection of Fines in Pennsylvania Criminal Cases: Preliminary Results from an Analysis of 10 Years of Court Data

By: Colin Sharpe, Andrew Christy, and Jeffrey T. Ward, Ph.D.<sup>1</sup>  
ACLU of Pennsylvania, February 28, 2019

There has not been an empirical study of the fines, costs, and restitution imposed by Pennsylvania courts in criminal cases. Last fall, the ACLU of Pennsylvania released a preliminary analysis of data concerning the imposition and collection of court costs in criminal cases.<sup>2</sup> We now take the same approach with fines. Among the seemingly basic questions that have remained unstudied and unanswered in Pennsylvania are the amounts imposed in cases, how long it takes defendants to pay that money, and how long court debt remains uncollected.<sup>3</sup> This paper is a first attempt to address these questions by looking at ten years of court data from the Common Pleas Case Management System (“CPCMS”) used by Pennsylvania’s courts of common pleas and the Philadelphia Municipal Court.<sup>4</sup>

## I. Data Overview and Methodology

The ACLU of Pennsylvania obtained a table of data from all criminal misdemeanor and felony cases in Pennsylvania courts of common pleas and the Philadelphia Municipal Court between August 17, 2008 and August 16, 2018. The table included the following data from each case:

- Disposition year
- Docket number
- Case Caption
- Representation Type for Defendant (public defender, private, other)
- Race
- Gender
- Amount of outstanding fines (if any)
- Amount of fines assessed (if any)
- Amount of outstanding costs (if any)

---

<sup>1</sup> Colin Sharpe is an Economics PhD candidate at Vanderbilt University. Andrew Christy is an attorney at the ACLU of Pennsylvania whose practice focuses on fines, costs, and restitution. Jeffrey T. Ward is an Associate Professor at Temple University whose research areas include developmental and life-course criminology, measurement, and quantitative methods.

<sup>2</sup> The study on costs, *Imposition and Collection of Court Costs in Pennsylvania Criminal Cases: Preliminary Results from an Analysis of 10 Years of Court Data*, is available at [www.aclupa.org/finesandcosts/research](http://www.aclupa.org/finesandcosts/research).

<sup>3</sup> Out of the 34,902 public defender cases in our dataset from 2013 that had fines imposed, 70% still had fines outstanding as of 2018. Out of the 24,684 cases with private representation from 2013, only 39% still had fines outstanding as of 2018. Of the 25,262 public defender cases from 2008 with fines assessed, 56% still had fines outstanding as of 2018, while of the 21,596 private cases from 2008 with fines assessed, only 28% had fines outstanding as of 2018.

<sup>4</sup> Fines are part of a criminal sentence and are intended as punishment. *See Commonwealth v. Rivera*, 95 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (describing the difference between fines, costs, and restitution). However, a sentencing court cannot impose a fine without making findings on the record that the defendant is or will be able to pay the fine, and tailoring the amount of the fine based on the defendant’s means. *See* 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c) and (d); Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(C).

- Amount of costs assessed (if any)
- Amount of outstanding restitution (if any)
- Amount of restitution assessed (if any)

Our analysis in this report is focused on the different financial impact of fines on defendants with means versus those who are indigent. We used type of counsel—public defender or court appointed equivalent versus private counsel—as a rough proxy for defendants’ financial status.<sup>5</sup> The dataset included a total of 2,339,847 cases. We excluded cases that lacked vital information from that dataset before running our analysis.<sup>6</sup> We also excluded 66,197 cases that had docket numbers from before 2008, on the theory that whatever circumstances may have caused those cases to linger means that they are not representative, and another 1,779 cases in which the current fine owed is *larger* than the fine originally assessed—something that should not be possible.

This left us with 1,719,368 cases representing \$418,314,533 in total assessed fines. We do not know the number of individual defendants, as one person may have multiple criminal cases. Of these cases, the public defender or other court appointed counsel provided representation in 1,133,440 cases, and private counsel provided representation in 585,928 cases.<sup>7</sup>

There is an important caveat to note with respect to the data. The data only tells us the amount of fines assessed at sentencing and how much money is currently owed. That certainly captures money that has been paid. However, it *also* captures debt that is forgiven. For example, some judges will waive fines post-sentencing if the defendant is later unable to pay them. Waiving \$500 in such a manner would show up in our data as if the defendant had *paid* that money. In a future analysis, with additional CPCMS data, we will be able to account for this. We expect that those results will show that public defender clients are paying even less than our current analysis suggests.

The data analysis presented here was conducted in Stata, which was used to sort and clean the data, generate summary statistics, and examine relationships between variables through regression analysis. For the sake of clarity, additional detail is provided in Appendix A.

Performing these analyses showed that the median—rather than average—reflects a more accurate picture of what most defendants experience. The reason for this is that although 99% of the assessed fines in our dataset are less than \$2,500, there are a small number of extremely large fines (including 54 cases with fines greater than \$100,000) that have a disproportionate influence

---

<sup>5</sup> We hope that in a future analysis, we will be able to cross-reference with defendants’ zip code information to further categorize defendants based on their likely income level.

<sup>6</sup> There were 4,603 cases with a representation type that made no sense, such as “CYS attorney” or “legal aid”—types of attorneys that do not represent criminal defendants. 547,894 cases lacked any information about type of representation, so we also omitted those cases from our analysis. Six cases had missing year information and were dropped.

<sup>7</sup> We included the following types of representation in the “public defender” category: Conflict Counsel, Court Appointed, Court Appointed - Co-Counsel, Court Appointed - Conflicts Counsel, Court Appointed – Pending, Court Appointed – Private, Court Appointed – Public, Court Appointed - Public Defender, Court Appointed – Vendor, Court Appointed/Public Defender, and Public Defender. The CPCMS category “private” was the only category we included for private counsel.

on comparisons between public and private defendants. While the presence of these extreme cases is not an issue in and of itself, in the present study we are primarily interested in how fines affect the typical defendant, and we lack sufficient information to properly contextualize extreme outlying observations. For this reason, we have based our primary analysis on median fines, which are much less sensitive to outliers and more representative of what a typical defendant could expect. We report averages in Appendix B, which also support the conclusions discussed herein.

Appendix A contains details on the construction and results of the linear regression. Appendix B contains the complete analysis of data used in this report. Appendix C contains a breakdown per county.

## II. Results and Discussion

### A. Complete Results from 2008 – 2018

Courts imposed fines in only 34% of the cases that we analyzed. Breaking it down further, 30% of PD cases and 42% of private counsel cases have fines—PD cases are far less likely to have a fine imposed. In cases where fines were imposed, the median amount assessed is \$300 for PD cases versus \$500 for private counsel cases. Defendants with private counsel are assessed a median fine that is 66% higher than those imposed in PD cases. These figures suggest that many courts are declining to impose fines, particularly against PD clients, and when they do, they may base their decision at least in part on defendants' financial means.

For fines that are imposed, our analysis shows that defendants in PD cases are paying significantly less than defendants with private counsel. For all cases over the ten-year span, the median paid among PD clients is \$150 and the median owed is \$150, whereas the median paid among defendants with private counsel is \$500 and the median owed is \$0 (having completely paid their balances). This is a significant distinction—if PD clients could afford to pay even \$300, then they would also have completely paid their fines.

A linear regression, a statistical technique designed to quantify relationships between variables, provides more evidence for the extra burden that higher costs impose on PD clients. On average, a \$100 dollar increase in fines assessed yields an increase in \$74 in fines outstanding for defendants with private representation and \$87 for PD clients, holding constant the race and gender of the defendant, and court type, county, and year of the case. This difference is statistically significant, and shows that higher fines translate into higher levels of debt for PD clients.<sup>8</sup>

During this ten-year time period, PD clients paid a total of \$55,685,515 in fines, compared to \$107,236,187 by private counsel. Thus, defendants with private counsel paid almost *twice* as many dollars in fines overall despite there being twice as many PD cases as private counsel cases in our data (approximately 1.1 million PD cases versus 585,000 private counsel cases). Also, when compared against the total amount of money that was assessed at sentencing—

---

<sup>8</sup> The results presented here are from a regression that excludes outlying observations. For further discussion of this issue and the methodology of the linear regression, see Appendix A.

\$211,742,950 for PD cases and \$206,571,583 for private cases—it is clear that the average PD client could have his fine reduced significantly without any impact on overall revenue collection.

### B. Results from 2013

While the above figures are all aggregates from 2008 – 2018, drilling down on 2013 data (which gives five years of collections) is illuminating. According to AOPC, in 2013 courts of common pleas imposed approximately \$56 million in fines, and they have collected only 38% of those fines.<sup>9</sup> Our data analyzed 34,902 PD cases and 24,684 cases with private counsel in which fines were imposed that year:

Median Amounts		
	PD Cases	Private Cases
Median assessed	\$300	\$510
Median paid	\$150	\$510
Median outstanding	\$150	\$0

PD clients in only 27% of the cases we examined were able to pay off their fines in full in five years. By contrast, 58% of private clients were able to pay their fines off in full in five years, even when typical fines assessed in privates cases are notably higher. There is a clear disparity between their financial means.

The data also suggests that PD clients could have their fines significantly reduced without any impact on revenue. As with our findings on court costs, a reduction of 50% on the fines imposed against PD clients would in theory have no impact on the amount actually collected by courts.

### C. Results from 2008

An analysis of data from 2008—which allows us to check on defendants’ progress now that 10 years have passed—presents a similar picture. According to AOPC, in 2008 courts of common pleas imposed approximately \$59 million in fines, and they have collected only 45% of those fines.<sup>10</sup> Our data analyzed 25,262 PD cases and 21,596 cases with private counsel in which fines were imposed that year:

Median Amounts		
	PD Cases	Private Cases
Median assessed	\$300	\$500
Median paid	\$200	\$500
Median outstanding	\$100	\$0

<sup>9</sup> “Collection Rates Over Time,” Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, available at <http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/research-and-statistics/dashboard-table-of-contents/collection-rate-of-payments-ordered-by-common-pleas-courts>.

<sup>10</sup> “Collection Rates Over Time,” Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, available at <http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/research-and-statistics/dashboard-table-of-contents/collection-rate-of-payments-ordered-by-common-pleas-courts>. As of the time of publication of this report, AOPC—for reasons that are unclear—has removed all 2008 data from the data dashboards. However, the ACLU of Pennsylvania recorded these figures before the data was removed.

Echoing results from the 2013 data, even after *ten years*, PD clients continue to struggle to pay their fines in full. If after five years, PD clients have paid \$150, by year ten they have paid only \$200—\$50 worth of additional payments over five years. Indeed, after ten years only 41% of PD clients have paid their fines in full, compared to 69% of defendants represented by private counsel. More than half of PD clients have even modest fines follow them into the next decade.

### III. Conclusion

As we have found, only 34% of felony and misdemeanor cases have fines imposed. The difference between indigent defendants and those with means is stark: 30% of PD cases have fines, compared with 42% of cases with private counsel. Compare that with court costs, which we know from our previous research are assessed in 89% of PD cases. This is a large disparity, which is likely driven in part by clearer guidance from case law and statutes that prohibit courts from imposing fines without finding that defendants are able to pay. *See* 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c) and (d). While such guidance has not entirely eliminated unaffordable fines, it has at least significantly reduced the use thereof, and courts are largely following their statutory obligation to not impose fines on indigent defendants.

Nevertheless, when indigent defendants are given a fine, they struggle to pay. Most defendants who are assessed a fine and are represented by the PD are assessed fines of about \$300. This is in addition to over \$1,000 in court costs per case, as described in our separate report on court costs. Given that the Federal Reserve estimates that 40% of Americans have insufficient savings to cover a \$400 emergency, it is no surprise that defendants struggle to pay their fines and costs.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, the fines that this report analyzed show that more than half of PD cases have defendants who continue to owe some combination of fines and costs more than ten years after sentencing. By contrast, nearly three-quarters of cases with private counsel have completely paid their financial obligations. PD clients are disproportionately burdened by fines and costs that they simply cannot afford.<sup>12</sup>

Do courts and the legislature intend for defendants to pay fines for 5, 10, 20+ years? The answer is likely no: no actor has thought about the burden that these fines impose and the length of time that they will follow defendants. Nor have the courts or legislature considered the burden imposed on judicial resources attempting to collect this money into perpetuity. The better approach is to tailor fines and costs to the defendant's financial ability at sentencing. Particularly for defendants who are represented by the PD, the court should either substantially reduce fines and costs, or identify an amount that the defendant can reasonably pay in the near future.

---

<sup>11</sup> Michelle Singletary, "Does America have a savings crisis?" *The Washington Post* (February 21, 2019), available at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/02/21/does-america-have-savings-crisis/?utm\\_term=.55f8246e14d1](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/02/21/does-america-have-savings-crisis/?utm_term=.55f8246e14d1).

<sup>12</sup> The results in this study make sense in the broader context of the total amount of court debt that defendants owe. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has set forth regulations on how defendants' payments should be credited. *See* 204 Pa. Code. § 29.405. In short, if a defendant has fully paid his fine, he has already paid his costs.

As our analysis shows, this tailored approach is unlikely to have any impact on courts' fiscal bottom line. PD clients could have their fines and costs reduced by 50%, and courts will still bring in about as much money as they have been for the past decade. The consistent experience of lawyers serving low-income clients, including attorneys at the ACLU, is that individuals who balk at large amounts of money that they cannot hope to afford to pay are nevertheless perfectly able and willing to pay down smaller amounts of debt. Thus, reducing fines from \$300 to \$150 and court costs from over \$1,000 to \$500 (or less, in individual cases) may actually encourage more defendants to pay, without any appreciable drop in revenue. This would have the added benefit of reducing the resources that courts must put into collecting unpaid fines and costs.

In the coming months, as we obtain new data from CPCMS that can address some of the problems with the dataset, as described in the methodology section of this report, we will update and revise the report accordingly. We will also look more closely at the total amounts of money that defendants owe, rather than looking at fines and costs in isolation. All findings will be posted on [www.aclupa.org/finesandcosts/research](http://www.aclupa.org/finesandcosts/research).

## Appendix A: Linear Regression Model

The purpose of the linear regression estimated below is to assess the effect of changes in assessed fines on fines outstanding, and to describe any differences in this effect between public defender cases and cases where the defendant has private representation. Formally, we estimate the following equation by ordinary least squares (OLS):

$$1. \quad F_i = \alpha + \delta P_i + \beta_1 A_i + \beta_2 P_i A_i + X_i \beta_3 + e_i$$

Where  $F_i$  is the fine outstanding in case  $i$ ,  $A_i$  is the fine assessed in case  $i$ ,  $P_i$  is an indicator for whether case  $i$  has a public defender (i.e.,  $P_i=1$  if the case has a public defender and 0 otherwise),  $X_i$  is a set of controls and  $e_i$  is a random error term.

The advantage to this construction is it allows for fines assessed to have a different effect depending on whether a case has public or private representation. To see this, note that if the case has private representation, then  $P_i=0$ , and the equation is reduced to:

$$2. \quad F_i = \alpha + \beta_1 A_i + X_i \beta_3 + e_i$$

Here, an increase of fines assessed increases fines outstanding by  $\beta_1$ . If the case has private representation, then  $P_i=1$ , and the equation is reduced to:

$$3. \quad F_i = (\alpha + \delta) + (\beta_1 + \beta_2) A_i + X_i \beta_3 + e_i$$

Here, an increase of fines assessed increases fines outstanding by  $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ . By estimating Equation 1, we can get approximations of  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$ , and thus reconstruct the effect that fines assessed has on fines outstanding, conditional on the control variables. Note that additional assumptions are required for these approximations to have a causal interpretation. Instead the results presented should be considered evidence of a correlation.

To estimate Equation 1 in two ways, we run an OLS regression of fines outstanding on fines assessed, an indicator of whether the case had public representation, and the interaction between these terms, as well as controls for the race and gender of the defendant, whether the case took place in a court of common pleas or not, and variables indicating the county and year in which the case took place. The results of this regression are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

VARIABLES	Fine Outstanding
Fine Assessed	0.7398*** (.0008)
Public	116.1572*** (1.8879)
Public*(Fine Assessed)	0.1304***

Constant	(0.0011) -526.9574 (11.6762)
Observations	556,190
R-squared	0.7971

Estimation includes county and year fixed effects.  
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses.  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Based on the results of this regression, our estimate for  $\beta_1$  is 0.7398, while our estimate for  $\beta_2$  is 0.1304. This indicates that the estimated effect of an increase of \$1 in the fine assessed is correlated with an increase of \$0.74 in cases with private representation, and with an increase of \$0.87 ( $0.7398+0.1304=0.8702$ ) in cases with public representation. Therefore, a \$100 dollar increase in fines assessed yields on average an increase in \$74 in fines outstanding for defendants with private representation and \$87 for defendants with public representation, among holding constant the race and gender of the defendant, and court type, county, and year of the case.

One caveat to this interpretation is that the results presented above exclude the 54 cases with fines assessed over \$100,000. The reason for this is that the raw data have a problem with influential observations - including these 54 cases eliminates the estimated effect of public representation. Since the fines involved are so much larger than the average, these observations have a disproportionate effect on the estimates, and they are disproportionately cases with private representation and unpaid fines. The effect is to mask the systematic differences in how public and private cases respond to increased fines in more typical cases. The rationale for exclusion is that we expect cases with very large fines to be different from other cases in many ways, and do not believe they are representative of how most defendants experience the justice system.

An issue with excluding these outlying cases is that the choice of cutoff is arbitrary. Removing the 7 largest observations is sufficient to generate a significant, positive signed difference in how an increase in fines assessed affects fines outstanding for public and private cases, which is reassuring that the above results hold for most reasonable fines. However, these are ad hoc adjustments.



## Appendix B: Raw Data

Starting Number of Cases: 2,339,847

There are a negligible number of records (263) for which there is no data for Year or Docket Number. Without the Docket information, county is undefined. These records are excluded from all analysis.

The data regarding Representation Type is inconsistent. 547894 specify no form of representation at all. Of the remaining 1791953, some of the categories appear to be garbage data; we are omitting others (“CYS Attorney,” “Legal Aide” and so on) because they do not appear relevant. There are 1787350 records with relevant Type specified.

6 of those records have no Year or Docket Number specified, leaving 1787344 records. Of these, 66,197 have docket numbers from before 2008. Since we only observe cases adjudicated between 2008 and 2018, we only observe those pre-2008 cases that took sufficiently long to adjudicate to fall within this window. We do not consider these to be representative, and do not consider them in our analysis. Finally, there are an additional 1,779 cases in which the fine outstanding was larger than the fine assessed. This appeared to indicate transcription problems in the data, and thus these cases were excluded from the main analysis as well<sup>13</sup>. This leaves us with a final sample of 1,719,368 cases.

We are considering the following Representation Type categories to constitute instances of defense by Public Defenders:

- Conflict Counsel
- Court Appointed
- Court Appointed - Co-Counsel
- Court Appointed - Conflicts Counsel
- Court Appointed - Pending
- Court Appointed - Private
- Court Appointed - Public
- Court Appointed - Public Defender
- Court Appointed - Vendor
- Court Appointed/Public Defender
- Public Defender

We are considering the Representation Type “Private” to be the one and only category that denotes private defense.

---

<sup>13</sup>The final results are robust to including this last category, which only changes the averages/medians by a few dollars in most cases.

**Summary Statistics, All Cases, 2008 – 2018**

	Number of Cases	Total Assessed Amount	Total Outstanding Amount	Avg Assessed Amount	Avg Outstanding Amount
Total	1719368	\$418,314,533.00	\$255,392,831.00	\$243.00	\$149.00
Public	1133440	\$211,742,950.00	\$156,057,435.00	\$187.00	\$138.00
Private	585928	\$206,571,583.00	\$99,335,396.00	\$353.00	\$170.00

**Summary Statistics, Cases with Assessed Fines > \$0, 2008 – 2018**

	Count	Fines Assessed		Fines Outstanding		Percent Paid
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean
Total	582172	\$719.00	\$350.00	\$439.00	\$100.00	42%
Public	336706	\$629.00	\$300.00	\$463.00	\$150.00	29%
Private	245466	\$842.00	\$500.00	\$405.00	\$0.00	59%

	Count	Percent Cases Paid in Full	Percent Cases Partially Paid	Percent Cases Paid Nothing
Total	582172	38.60%	7.38%	54.02%
Public	336706	26.42%	6.90%	66.68%
Private	245466	55.30%	8.04%	36.66%

**Summary Statistics, Cases with Assessed Fines > \$0, 2008 Only**

	Count	Fines Assessed		Fines Outstanding		Percent Paid
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean
Total	46858	\$834.00	\$500.00	\$417.00	\$0.00	57%
Public	25262	\$775.00	\$300.00	\$499.00	\$100.00	44%
Private	21596	\$902.00	\$500.00	\$321.00	\$0.00	72%

	Count	Percent Cases Paid in Full	Percent Cases Partially Paid	Percent Cases Paid Nothing
Total	46858	53.60%	8.29%	38.11%
Public	25262	40.43%	8.92%	50.45%
Private	21596	68.78%	7.55%	23.67%

**Summary Statistics, Cases with Assessed Fines > \$0, 2013 Only**

	Count	Fines Assessed		Fines Outstanding		Percent Paid
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean
Total	59586	\$726.00	\$400.00	\$421.00	\$100.00	43%
Public	34902	\$605.00	\$300.00	\$430.00	\$150.00	30%
Private	24684	\$896.00	\$510.00	\$409.00	\$0.00	61%

	Count	Percent Cases Paid in Full	Percent Cases Partially Paid	Percent Cases Paid Nothing
Total	59586	39.96%	7.80%	52.25%
Public	34902	27.34%	7.37%	65.29%
Private	24684	57.79%	8.41%	33.80%

### Appendix C: County Level Fines Data

County level	Number of Cases			Number of Cases w/ Fine Assessed > \$0		
County Name	Total	Public	Private	Total	Public	Private
Adams	9714	5810	3904	8297	5018	3279
Allegheny	121504	75085	46419	28234	11973	16261
Armstrong	5178	2854	2324	3400	1857	1543
Beaver	21844	14311	7533	14596	10002	4594
Bedford	5595	3674	1921	4611	3148	1463
Berks	42118	29324	12794	30213	20637	9576
Blair	21493	15461	6032	16473	12381	4092
Bradford	6982	3958	3024	4588	2712	1876
Bucks	59804	30027	29777	18963	5732	13231
Butler	17904	12622	5282	10078	6961	3117
Cambria	20150	14855	5295	13172	9530	3642
Cameron	597	456	141	344	274	70
Carbon	6375	4052	2323	1942	966	976
Centre	14191	7827	6364	8112	4323	3789
Chester	41095	22199	18896	28719	15531	13188
Clarion	4816	3117	1699	869	439	430
Clearfield	7258	4681	2577	6830	4489	2341
Clinton	4597	3412	1185	3190	2334	856
Columbia	7177	4757	2420	5506	3718	1788
Crawford	8647	5674	2973	7896	5149	2747
Cumberland	24655	17272	7383	15057	9757	5300
Dauphin	48091	33773	14318	36537	26116	10421
Delaware	71763	37563	34200	18205	7238	10967
Elk	3471	2558	913	2229	1745	484
Erie	26842	17950	8892	10254	5767	4487
Fayette	19171	12380	6791	14097	8971	5126
Forest	534	336	198	354	225	129
Franklin	19896	14730	5166	12919	9328	3591
Fulton	1854	1272	582	1427	967	460
Greene	3819	2542	1277	2883	1814	1069
Huntingdon	6295	4492	1803	4319	3303	1016
Indiana	9784	6769	3015	7100	5000	2100
Jefferson	3004	1544	1460	2435	1303	1132
Juniata	2105	1470	635	920	566	354
Lackawanna	19386	11133	8253	4257	1829	2428
Lancaster	46550	25956	20594	30781	17738	13043

Lawrence	10688	7683	3005	2492	1505	987
Lebanon	16050	10545	5505	14082	9378	4704
Lehigh	33268	17481	15787	12278	4988	7290
Luzerne	30944	16946	13998	8402	3200	5202
Lycoming	17134	12008	5126	6094	3548	2546
McKean	3266	2193	1073	1198	620	578
Mercer	11981	7853	4128	2760	1335	1425
Mifflin	6271	4782	1489	4729	3767	962
Monroe	18922	10754	8168	4815	2322	2493
Montgomery	77797	38853	38944	31128	13665	17463
Montour	1039	710	329	841	586	255
Northampton	19286	10624	8662	9370	4200	5170
Northumberland	9493	6670	2823	7504	5427	2077
Perry	4839	3203	1636	1965	1071	894
Philadelphia	544382	414963	129419	25382	14653	10729
Pike	5006	2689	2317	3959	2256	1703
Potter	2087	1402	685	1290	802	488
Schuylkill	18169	13398	4771	6061	3715	2346
Snyder	3469	2006	1463	1429	699	730
Somerset	7219	4673	2546	4840	3147	1693
Sullivan	579	331	248	345	202	143
Susquehanna	3453	2007	1446	2628	1626	1002
Tioga	3587	1918	1669	2041	1014	1027
Union	2974	1951	1023	1048	563	485
Venango	4375	2227	2148	3255	1591	1664
Warren	3976	2971	1005	2931	2267	664
Washington	20547	11457	9090	5094	2113	2981
Wayne	3977	2459	1518	2251	1182	1069
Westmoreland	34263	20199	14064	7846	3197	4649
Wyoming	3811	2294	1517	2450	1469	981
York	62257	40294	21963	21857	11757	10100

County level	Avg Fine Assessed (where Assessed > \$0)			Avg Fine Outstanding (where Assessed > \$0)		
County Name	All	Public	Private	All	Public	Private
Adams	\$687.37	\$646.43	\$750.02	\$377.70	\$432.41	\$293.98
Allegheny	\$1,051.87	\$937.68	\$1,135.94	\$632.37	\$727.41	\$562.40
Armstrong	\$596.05	\$550.88	\$650.41	\$382.68	\$403.08	\$358.13
Beaver	\$433.16	\$358.41	\$595.90	\$322.44	\$311.98	\$345.23
Bedford	\$856.42	\$812.99	\$949.87	\$514.57	\$544.67	\$449.79
Berks	\$449.41	\$341.14	\$682.74	\$321.45	\$285.68	\$398.55
Blair	\$630.39	\$562.64	\$835.36	\$429.57	\$438.60	\$402.22
Bradford	\$836.47	\$811.50	\$872.55	\$605.78	\$689.06	\$485.39
Bucks	\$1,157.93	\$1,114.71	\$1,176.65	\$647.43	\$840.35	\$563.85
Butler	\$562.65	\$438.05	\$840.93	\$226.17	\$223.45	\$232.26
Cambria	\$342.86	\$326.24	\$386.34	\$169.01	\$188.94	\$116.84
Cameron	\$483.36	\$473.81	\$520.73	\$327.93	\$341.92	\$273.15
Carbon	\$790.71	\$802.53	\$779.01	\$439.15	\$616.08	\$264.03
Centre	\$578.14	\$556.48	\$602.84	\$286.75	\$364.24	\$198.33
Chester	\$672.56	\$618.41	\$736.33	\$379.93	\$452.60	\$294.36
Clarion	\$1,303.90	\$1,047.68	\$1,565.49	\$471.56	\$552.85	\$388.57
Clearfield	\$494.63	\$445.00	\$589.79	\$263.68	\$272.58	\$246.62
Clinton	\$758.64	\$706.35	\$901.21	\$333.91	\$370.31	\$234.66
Columbia	\$495.78	\$464.88	\$560.05	\$295.29	\$334.74	\$213.26
Crawford	\$508.55	\$481.68	\$558.91	\$178.97	\$201.92	\$135.95
Cumberland	\$659.76	\$579.38	\$807.74	\$391.68	\$407.32	\$362.88
Dauphin	\$472.42	\$397.22	\$660.89	\$274.23	\$272.61	\$278.30
Delaware	\$938.17	\$924.61	\$947.11	\$749.98	\$837.17	\$692.44
Elk	\$531.81	\$488.41	\$688.26	\$325.84	\$358.93	\$206.54
Erie	\$906.62	\$872.02	\$951.08	\$650.59	\$732.05	\$545.88
Fayette	\$628.48	\$574.32	\$723.27	\$502.68	\$513.09	\$484.46
Forest	\$930.44	\$956.01	\$885.83	\$595.13	\$723.04	\$372.02
Franklin	\$573.06	\$546.28	\$642.64	\$312.55	\$346.69	\$223.89
Fulton	\$545.22	\$498.30	\$643.85	\$292.66	\$314.21	\$247.38
Greene	\$815.42	\$799.03	\$843.22	\$460.44	\$555.02	\$299.94
Huntingdon	\$586.64	\$532.10	\$763.93	\$309.46	\$344.98	\$193.97
Indiana	\$577.51	\$560.70	\$617.53	\$348.75	\$405.12	\$214.52
Jefferson	\$917.59	\$726.44	\$1,137.61	\$500.79	\$620.75	\$362.70
Juniata	\$790.08	\$792.20	\$786.70	\$424.94	\$514.31	\$282.06
Lackawanna	\$1,044.46	\$1,089.66	\$1,010.41	\$691.62	\$849.95	\$572.36
Lancaster	\$584.48	\$486.09	\$718.28	\$413.23	\$416.00	\$409.46
Lawrence	\$1,046.11	\$822.00	\$1,387.84	\$702.46	\$604.47	\$851.87
Lebanon	\$600.36	\$558.65	\$683.53	\$322.28	\$354.37	\$258.31

Lehigh	\$884.39	\$806.21	\$937.88	\$541.90	\$651.32	\$467.03
Luzerne	\$884.68	\$765.46	\$958.01	\$572.71	\$639.42	\$531.67
Lycoming	\$877.58	\$887.61	\$863.59	\$494.90	\$595.95	\$354.08
McKean	\$849.29	\$817.37	\$883.53	\$378.15	\$510.61	\$236.06
Mercer	\$862.73	\$837.15	\$886.70	\$469.94	\$570.70	\$375.55
Mifflin	\$535.50	\$474.50	\$774.38	\$346.67	\$332.15	\$403.55
Monroe	\$936.80	\$885.30	\$984.76	\$481.48	\$562.70	\$405.82
Montgomery	\$701.44	\$652.67	\$739.60	\$399.87	\$499.40	\$321.99
Montour	\$809.27	\$862.03	\$688.03	\$439.20	\$545.67	\$194.53
Northampton	\$749.44	\$668.00	\$815.60	\$394.32	\$507.32	\$302.53
Northumberland	\$396.44	\$336.93	\$551.92	\$241.33	\$251.78	\$214.00
Perry	\$657.93	\$663.34	\$651.45	\$253.27	\$339.36	\$150.13
Philadelphia	\$1,028.98	\$1,019.43	\$1,042.02	\$806.86	\$883.63	\$702.02
Pike	\$997.24	\$1,085.05	\$880.91	\$548.09	\$748.49	\$282.61
Potter	\$1,042.50	\$1,259.13	\$686.47	\$358.81	\$444.48	\$218.01
Schuylkill	\$598.45	\$606.16	\$586.22	\$379.80	\$454.83	\$260.98
Snyder	\$698.80	\$656.93	\$738.89	\$244.18	\$318.91	\$172.62
Somerset	\$499.59	\$468.74	\$556.95	\$268.55	\$302.54	\$205.38
Sullivan	\$625.58	\$579.95	\$690.04	\$232.75	\$313.17	\$119.15
Susquehanna	\$450.49	\$380.38	\$564.26	\$232.76	\$253.95	\$198.38
Tioga	\$539.82	\$485.55	\$593.41	\$174.83	\$201.68	\$148.31
Union	\$838.50	\$811.82	\$869.48	\$343.42	\$451.30	\$218.20
Venango	\$707.39	\$620.25	\$790.71	\$275.73	\$272.40	\$278.92
Warren	\$1,014.57	\$999.03	\$1,067.64	\$610.77	\$664.92	\$425.89
Washington	\$951.60	\$874.34	\$1,006.36	\$584.39	\$669.22	\$524.27
Wayne	\$738.96	\$654.77	\$832.05	\$327.31	\$368.56	\$281.69
Westmoreland	\$1,061.42	\$994.07	\$1,107.73	\$723.39	\$854.43	\$633.28
Wyoming	\$792.10	\$701.25	\$928.14	\$364.62	\$410.63	\$295.73
York	\$1,003.79	\$1,009.99	\$996.58	\$516.15	\$647.17	\$363.64

County level	Median Fine Assessed (where Assessed > \$0)		Median Fine Outstanding (where Assessed > \$0)	
	County Name	Public	Private	Public
Adams	\$300.00	\$500.00	\$200.00	\$0.00
Allegheny	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$400.00	\$25.00
Armstrong	\$300.00	\$400.00	\$200.00	\$100.00
Beaver	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$250.00	\$150.00
Bedford	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$250.00	\$0.00
Berks	\$100.00	\$150.00	\$100.00	\$100.00
Blair	\$250.00	\$400.00	\$200.00	\$100.00
Bradford	\$500.00	\$600.00	\$350.00	\$194.99
Bucks	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$500.00	\$0.00
Butler	\$100.00	\$400.00	\$50.00	\$0.00
Cambria	\$200.00	\$300.00	\$100.00	\$0.00
Cameron	\$300.00	\$325.00	\$300.00	\$100.00
Carbon	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Centre	\$138.00	\$300.00	\$50.00	\$0.00
Chester	\$30.00	\$300.00	\$10.00	\$0.00
Clarion	\$1,000.00	\$950.00	\$5.00	\$0.00
Clearfield	\$200.00	\$300.00	\$50.00	\$0.00
Clinton	\$500.00	\$600.00	\$100.00	\$0.00
Columbia	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$271.05	\$0.00
Crawford	\$250.00	\$250.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Cumberland	\$300.00	\$500.00	\$100.00	\$0.00
Dauphin	\$200.00	\$400.00	\$75.00	\$0.00
Delaware	\$700.00	\$1,000.00	\$500.00	\$476.96
Elk	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Erie	\$300.00	\$750.00	\$200.00	\$50.00
Fayette	\$400.00	\$400.00	\$300.00	\$300.00
Forest	\$700.00	\$750.00	\$500.00	\$0.00
Franklin	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$150.00	\$0.00
Fulton	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$130.56	\$0.00
Greene	\$500.00	\$560.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Huntingdon	\$400.00	\$500.00	\$200.00	\$0.00
Indiana	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$400.00	\$0.00
Jefferson	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$400.00	\$0.00
Juniata	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$60.70	\$0.00
Lackawanna	\$750.00	\$750.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Lancaster	\$100.00	\$300.00	\$100.00	\$100.00
Lawrence	\$500.00	\$750.00	\$200.00	\$0.00



Lebanon	\$300.00	\$400.00	\$150.00	\$0.00
Lehigh	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Luzerne	\$500.00	\$1,000.00	\$402.67	\$58.26
Lycoming	\$600.00	\$600.00	\$250.00	\$0.00
McKean	\$500.00	\$600.00	\$100.00	\$0.00
Mercer	\$750.00	\$750.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Mifflin	\$300.00	\$350.00	\$200.00	\$0.00
Monroe	\$750.00	\$750.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Montgomery	\$300.00	\$500.00	\$100.00	\$0.00
Montour	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Northampton	\$300.00	\$500.00	\$200.00	\$0.00
Northumberland	\$150.00	\$300.00	\$100.00	\$0.00
Perry	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Philadelphia	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$300.00
Pike	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$170.68	\$0.00
Potter	\$400.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Schuylkill	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$150.00	\$0.00
Snyder	\$300.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Somerset	\$300.00	\$325.00	\$200.00	\$0.00
Sullivan	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$176.30	\$0.00
Susquehanna	\$300.00	\$300.00	\$194.08	\$0.00
Tioga	\$200.00	\$300.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Union	\$500.00	\$750.00	\$100.00	\$0.00
Venango	\$300.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Warren	\$800.00	\$1,000.00	\$436.13	\$0.00
Washington	\$593.00	\$750.00	\$300.00	\$0.00
Wayne	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$216.79	\$0.00
Westmoreland	\$925.00	\$1,000.00	\$500.00	\$163.57
Wyoming	\$500.00	\$750.00	\$416.46	\$0.00
York	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$200.00	\$0.00